The 2026/27 Harvest Plan is announced with a record nominal volume of resources, but fails to address the sector's structural challenges.

Announced on June 30, 2026, and valid from July 1, 2026, to June 30, 2027, the 2026/27 Harvest Plan foresees a record nominal volume of resources for rural credit. This includes R$ 525,1 billion for agribusiness, a 1,7% increase compared to the previous cycle, and R$ 97,3 billion for family farming, a 9% increase in the same comparison.

Despite the nominal growth in resources, the plan does not alter the financing conditions of the sector. The policy maintains its structure based on the supply of credit with some degree of subsidy, but fails to address challenges that have become central to the financial sustainability of Brazilian agriculture, such as the high indebtedness of producers and negotiation mechanisms, restrictions on access to credit, and rural insurance. In a context of high costs and greater exposure to climate and market risks, these factors tend to limit the plan's ability to sustain guarantees and provide predictability for producers in the next harvest.

The fiscal cost of the Plano Safra (agricultural plan) stems from the equalization of interest rates on rural credit, a mechanism by which the government covers the difference between the cost of borrowing for financial institutions and the rate actually paid by the producer. This subsidy is mainly concentrated in lines aimed at family farming and low-carbon agriculture programs. For the 2026/27 harvest, the cost of equalization was estimated at R$ 18,1 billion, about 35% higher than that recorded in the previous cycle. Even so, the announced interest rates had modest reductions, between 0,5 and 1,5 percentage points in some lines, while others remained unchanged. The high basic interest rate of the economy (Selic of 14,25% p.a.[1]) restricts the scope for more significant reductions, while the government's fiscal problems reduce its capacity to expand subsidies. As a result, the cost of rural credit remains high precisely at a time when producers' profit margins are being squeezed (see more details in " Agribusiness could break records in 2026, but the numbers still don't add up in the field ").

The challenge of the current situation goes even beyond the level of interest rates. The credit environment has become significantly more restrictive: rural default rates have reached historically high levels, according to data from the Central Bank and Serasa Experian, while the increase in judicial reorganizations has raised the risk perception of financial institutions, leading banks to adopt more conservative criteria.

This trend was already observed in the previous harvest. Credit contracts for production costs fell by 11%, while loan approvals dropped by 15%. In investment credit, the contraction was even more intense: a 16% drop in contracts and a 30% drop in loan approvals[2]. These indicators show that the volume of resources announced by the Harvest Plan does not directly translate into greater availability of financing. In practice, the effective release of resources depends on the willingness of financial institutions to assume risk and the ability of producers to meet the eligibility criteria. Another critical issue is the decrease in resources allocated to production cost and marketing credits, which finance the operational expenses of the production cycle (inputs and labor), guaranteeing production.

Also noteworthy is the complete absence of action regarding rural insurance. The Rural Insurance Premium Subsidy Program (PSR) has suffered successive budget cuts and, in 2026/27, is expected to cover less than 3% of the planted area, the lowest level in the last two decades. This limitation is especially worrying given the predictions of a more intense El Niño event, with the potential to increase agricultural losses in several producing regions. In response, the government has only announced the creation of a working group to monitor climate impacts, an initiative considered insufficient by sector representatives given the need to expand risk management instruments.

In the environmental field, the plan reinforces incentives for sustainable production. Among the measures announced is the prohibition of the use of subsidized rural credit in projects involving the suppression of native vegetation, in addition to granting a discount of up to one percentage point on interest rates for producers with a regular Rural Environmental Registry (CAR) and who adopt certified sustainable agricultural practices. The measures bring agricultural policy closer to the environmental agenda, although doubts remain regarding the interpretation of the prohibition on the suppression of native vegetation. It is unclear whether the restriction applies only to cases of illegal deforestation or also to suppression authorized by the Forest Code, which could generate legal uncertainty and conflicts in the implementation of the policy.

In summary, the 2026/27 Harvest Plan is launched in a context of favorable macroeconomic indicators for agriculture – 0,7% growth in the sector's GDP in the first quarter of 2026, a record grain harvest estimated at 358 million tons, and an expansion of approximately 4,5% in agribusiness exports – but these results have not translated into greater profitability for producers. Increased financial costs, credit restrictions, and growing indebtedness are squeezing margins and could compromise the performance of the next harvest. In this context, although it nominally expands available resources, the Plan does not address the factors that currently limit its effectiveness. Without structural measures to strengthen rural insurance, expand access to credit, and address high levels of indebtedness, the record volume may not translate into effective support for production.

[1] Data from the Central Bank of Brazil available at: https://www.gov.br/agricultura/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/2026/credito-rural-empresarial-atinge-r-404-bilhoes-no-plano-safra-2025-2026

[2] Data from the Central Bank of Brazil: https://www.bcb.gov.br/controleinflacao/historicotaxasjuros