COMPARTILHAR

US confirms 25% tariff on Brazilian products.

07/16/26 - Leandro Gilio | Renato Laffranchi Falcao

International Trade | Macroeconomics | Geopolitics

US confirms 25% tariff on Brazilian products.

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Tariffs applied via Section 301 come into effect on July 22, but preserve most Brazilian agricultural exports on the list of exceptions.

The new round of tariffs proposed in June, which came into effect this month by the United States, has generated concern in various sectors of the Brazilian economy. The measures stem from the conclusion of an investigation conducted under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, initiated in 2025, which identified practices considered detrimental to US economic interests and resulted in the adoption of retaliatory measures. The decision was announced on July 15 and will take effect on July 22, 2026, after a public consultation period. Along with the announcement, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) released an extensive list of exceptions to the new tariffs, covering 2.127 tariff lines. This significantly reduced the effective scope of the measure, preserving a significant portion of Brazilian exports from the tariff.

 

 

It is important to highlight that Brazil is involved in two distinct proceedings under Section 301. The first is unique to Brazil and refers to the investigation conducted by the United States specifically against Brazil. The scope of the investigation covers topics such as the PIX system, barriers to US ethanol, illegal deforestation, judicial decisions, and piracy, among other aspects. As a result of the investigation, an additional 25% tariff on Brazilian products was proposed in June, with its entry into force scheduled for July 22.

The second process involves countries that, according to the investigating body, have deficiencies in combating forced labor. The analysis considers both the occurrence of forced labor in domestic production and the importation of products originating from countries associated with these practices. The proposal covers 60 countries, including Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, the United Kingdom, Russia, South Korea, Switzerland, and Japan. In this case, an additional tariff of 12,5% ​​is foreseen for the countries included in the investigation, although there is still no defined date for its implementation.

For Brazil, if both measures are effectively implemented, the additional tariff related to forced labor will be added to the 25% rate applied under the Section 301 investigation (total of 37,5%). Currently, only the tariff resulting from the specific investigation against Brazil has a defined effective date. There is no further information regarding the eventual implementation of the tariffs related to the forced labor investigation.

Under U.S. law, tariffs applied under Section 301 expire after four years, except if a representative of a benefiting domestic activity or industry formally requests their continuation, in which case the measure may be reevaluated after the expiration period.

Without going into the merits of the consistency of the investigation's conclusions, it is noteworthy that the final document released by the USTR excluded 2.127 tariff lines from the additional tariff charge, of which 244 correspond to agricultural products. Regarding the list of exceptions released at the end of the investigation in June 2026, 433 new tariff lines were included, 71 of which relate to agricultural products. Among the items included are coffee (beans and soluble), beef, orange juice, some fruits, fish (such as tilapia), fertilizers, cellulose, and other products relevant to bilateral trade. In agribusiness, the exceptions preserve a significant portion of Brazilian exports destined for the US market, corresponding to 66,8% of the value exported in 2025, equivalent to US$ 7,67 billion.

 

 

 

The composition of the list of exceptions suggests that the definition of the measures was not only associated with the objectives of the commercial investigation, but also with the structure of the production chains and the supply conditions of the US market. Products in which Brazil plays a significant role as a supplier were largely covered by the exemptions.

According to the document released by the USTR itself, the exceptions cover raw materials whose tariffs could cause a shortage of domestic supply; products that could generate significant disruptions to the US economy; and items that cannot be produced in sufficient quantities or at competitive prices in the United States, nor obtained from other sources under suitable conditions.

 

This aspect becomes even more relevant in a context of inflationary pressure on food in the United States. In June 2026, food inflation (CPI – food group) accumulated a 3% increase over 12 months, a high value by US standards, with notable increases recorded in categories such as beef and coffee. The imposition of high tariffs on products with a significant share in the domestic consumption basket could intensify these price pressures.

The direct impacts of the new tariffs on Brazilian agribusiness tend to be heterogeneous across different activities. Although a significant portion of the export agenda has been preserved by the announced exceptions, uncertainties remain regarding the indirect effects on trade flows, investments, price formation, and international competitiveness. Among the segments potentially most exposed to the new tariffs are wood, sugar, tobacco, agricultural machinery, and textile fibers—products that are not included in the exception lists released so far. It is worth noting that even for products subject to export quotas to the United States, such as some sugar exports from the North and Northeast regions, the additional tariff will also be applied.

Regarding the reversal of the process, official bilateral negotiations remain limited at the moment. A favorable environment for advancing negotiations is not observed, and therefore, the trend is towards maintaining the tariff measures in the short term. Business entities are still seeking a negotiating path.

 

 

 

 

*Note: To access the official document released by the USTR, click here.